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Robert W. Hamilton *
LTHOUGH several important judicial decisions appeared during the
current survey period, the most significant events which occurred in
the area of business associations were legislative or administrative.
I. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
Texas Business Corporation Act. Most of the revisions made in the Texas
Business Corporation Act during the past year were minor. However, two
of these revisions-the short form merger section and the administrative
dissolution of corporations-are significant. Other minor changes are col-
lected in the note.'
The new "short form merger" statute' allows a parent corporation own-
ing at least ninety per cent of the outstanding shares of each class of a
subsidiary corporation to merge the subsidiary into the parent without a
shareholders' vote of either corporation. The theoretical basis of the statute
is that a vote of the subsidiary's shareholders is unnecessary because the
minority shareholders are, in any event, unable to block the merger,' and
that a vote of the parent's shareholders is unnecessary because the merger
will not materially affect their rights. The latter conclusion is based on the
relatively slight change in the parent's interest in the subsidiary resulting
from the merger. Actually, the underlying purpose of the statute is to
effectuate a saving of the cost of proxy solicitations and meetings in situa-
tions where the results are predetermined. Moreover, this short merger pro-
cedure creates no appraisal rights on the part of dissenting shareholders of
the parent.
The most difficult theoretical problem with the short merger statute
lies in its treatment of the minority shareholders of the subsidiary. In a
B.A., Swarthmore College; J.D., University of Chicago. Professor of Law, University of Texas
at Austin. The assistance of James Welch, a third-year student at the University of Texas School
of Law, is gratefully acknowledged.
' Tex. Laws 1969, ch. 835, at 2483, made several changes in the Texas Business Corporation Act:
(1) Article 2.10A was modified to permit a "Statement of Change of Registered Office of Registered
Agent, or Both" which recites that the change was authorized by either the board of directors or
an officer authorized by the board of directors. Previously a recitation that the change was author-
ized by the board of directors was required. (2) Article 2.101D, relating to resignation of registered
agents, was modified to require notice to the corporation that the agent was resigning, followed by
a triplicate filing of notice with the Secretary of State. The Secretary must mark "filed" on each
copy of the notice, and send one copy to the corporation and one to the agent, retaining the third
in his files. Heretofore, the provision pertaining to the procedure for resignation was only skeletal.
(3) Analogous changes were also made in articles 8.09 and 8.16 relating to foreign corporations
authorized to transact business in Texas. Tex. Laws 1969, ch. 834, at 2477, makes similar changes
in the Texas Non-Profit Corporation Act, TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1396 (1962).
2Tex. Laws 1969, ch. 280, at 844, added a new article 5.16 to the Texas Business Corporation
Act. This amendment is based on an optional provision in the Model Business Corporation Act. See
2 MODEL Bus. CoRIP. ACT ANN. § 68A (1960). Approximately twenty states have enacted short
merger statutes. The ownership requirement in these statutes is variously set at 90, 95 or 100 per
cent. For a criticism of such statutes, see Comment, The Short Merger Statute, 32 U. CHI. L. REV.
596 (1965).
aTFx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 5.06, 5.07 (Supp. 1969-1970) require approval of a merger
by only two-thirds of the outstanding shares of each class of each corporation.
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merger between independent corporations, it is unlikely that two-thirds of
the shareholders of a corporation would approve a merger that is unfair to
them. However, in the merger of a subsidiary into its parent, no such
automatic protection exists against terms unfair to the subsidiary's mi-
nority shareholders. To the contrary, terms which are unfair to the
minority shareholders may be advantageous from the standpoint of the
parent. The new article 5.16E' attempts to avoid this problem by provid-
ing a special appraisal procedure for the shares of minority shareholders.
A resolution of the directors of the parent corporation, setting forth the
securities, cash, or other property offered to the shareholders of the sub-
sidiary, must be included in the articles of merger and must be sent to
each shareholder of record of the subsidiary within ten days after the
effective date of the merger. Each shareholder then has twenty days in
which to object to the merger and to state his view with regard to the fair
value of his shares. The corporation, in turn, has twenty days to accept
the shareholder's valuation or propose a valuation of its own. The share-
holder, if agreement is not reached, finally has sixty days to petition a court
of competent jurisdiction, in the county in which the principal office of
the corporation is located, to establish the value of the shares as provided
in article 5.12.' The procedure is the exclusive remedy of dissenting share-
holders in the absence of fraud.'
Practical limitations on the value of the appraisal procedure as protec-
tion for minority shareholders include: (1) the expense of the proceeding
itself, (2) the possible inconvenience of a proceeding in the county in
which the corporation's principal office is located, and (3) the additional
federal income taxes that may be due if a cash payment is received as
contrasted with receipt of securities of the parent corporation, which may
qualify as a tax-free exchange.
The other significant revision in the Texas Business Corporation Act
during the survey period authorizes involuntary dissolution by adminis-
trative action. The franchise' and business corporation statutes' dealing
with delinquent corporations were revised to simplify the procedure by
which the charters of such corporations are forfeited. Formerly, article
12.14 of the general taxation statutes9 provided that failure to file reports
or pay taxes would result in administrative action forfeiting "the right to
do business" in the state. The courts were closed to such corporations and
partnership liability existed for directors and officers who continued the
corporate business. If the deficiencies were not corrected within 120 days,
4 Id. art. 5.16E.
'Id. art. 5.12 (1956). After the petition is fled, appraisers are to be appointed to determine
the value of the shares.
' If the procedure were not exclusive, the shareholder might have the right to have a jury deter-
mine the value of his shares. Farnsworth v. Massey, 365 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1963).
The franchise tax statutes were amended by Tex. Laws 1969, ch. 801, at 2366.
8 The Texas Business Corporation Act was amended by Tex. Laws 1969, ch. 835, at 2483. The
amendments cover the revocation of either a charter of a domestic corporation or a certificate of
authority to transact business in Texas of a foreign corporation. Id. ch. 834, at 2477, made anal-
ogous changes in the Texas Non-Profit Corporations Act, TEx. REv. Csv. STAT. ANN. art. 1396
(1962).
9 TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 12.14 (Supp. 1969).
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article 12.15 directed the Attorney General, on notification by the Secre-
tary of State, to bring suit to cause a forfeiture of the charter of the de-
linquent corporation. The new amendments authorize the Secretary of
State to revoke the charter of a corporation upon receipt of a certificate
of delinquency from the franchise tax division of the Comptroller of Pub-
lic Accounts. In this manner, a court proceeding is avoided. In addition,
the amendments add, as a ground for involuntary administrative dissolu-
tion, the failure to maintain a registered agent. The amendments also pro-
vide a grace period of twelve months in which the corporation may cor-
rect the ground on which dissolution was ordered or demonstrate that no
ground for involuntary dissolution existed.
Corporate Criminal Liability. I have previously analyzed at length the
unique Texas approach toward imposing criminal liability on corporations. 1"
The 61st Legislature took the first small step toward bringing Texas law
into conformity with the law in other jurisdictions in this area.
Texas is apparently the only state which generally refuses to permit
a corporation to be criminally responsible for the wrongful acts of its
agents. The Texas position is founded on two distinct rationales: (1) The
word "person" in the accusatory portions of the Texas Penal Code does
not include corporations," and (2) there does not exist any procedure by
which corporations may be held criminally responsible since the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure invariably assumes that the defendant is an
individual."
Senate Bills 5 and 6, which were enacted as additions to the Texas Penal
Code, made corporations amenable to criminal prosecution only for two
new misdemeanors. These offenses are (1) emitting air contaminants which
cause air pollution unless the emission is in conformity with a variance
granted by the Texas Air Control Board, and (2) discharging waste into
water which causes water pollution unless the waste is discharged in com-
pliance with a permit issued by an appropriate Texas agency." To over-
come the procedural difficulties involved in prosecuting corporations under
the Code of Criminal Procedure, the legislation creates a separate code of
criminal procedure for these two offenses. This Code may serve as a
model for future legislation extending corporate liability to other types of
crimes." Proponents of this legislation hope that the new offenses created
" See generally Hamilton, Corporate Criminal Liability in Texas, 47 TEXAs L. REV. 60 (1968).
" This construction is based upon an inference drawn from TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 22
(1952): "Whenever any property or interest is intended to be protected by this Code, and the
term 'person' or any other general term is used to designate the party whose property it is intended
to protect, the protection given shall extend to the property of the State, and of all public or pri-
vate corporations." See Judge Lynch Int'l Book Co. v. State, 84 Tex. Crim. 459, 208 S.W. 526
(1919).
2For example, TEX. CoDE CRrm. PRoc. ANN. arts. 16.01, 16.08, 33.03, 33.06, 42.14 (1966)
require that the defendant be "present" at various times during the trial and sentencing. See Overt
v. State, 97 Tex. Crim. 202, 260 S.W. 856 (1924); Thompson v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 348 S.W.2d
274 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1961), error ref. n.r.e.
"z The appropriate agency may be the Texas Water Quality Board, the Texas Water Development
Board, or the Texas Railroad Commission. Tex. Laws 1969, ch. 154, at 484.
"4The Texas Attorney General prior to enactment, issued an opinion that this legislation was
constitutional. Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. M-348 (1969). This writer agrees with the Attorney
General's conclusion insofar as it relates to corporations. However, the Attorney General also con-
1970]
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by this legislation will be a swift and effective tool which can be admin-
istered by local district attorneys to combat air and water pollution." It
also may appropriately be used to combat leaf burning and other sporadic
or occasional acts of pollution.
Professional Corporation Acts. During the regular session, the Texas Leg-
islature passed both a professional corporation" and a professional associa-
tion act."' These two pieces of legislation, apparently drawn largely from
similar legislation enacted in other states, are not integrated with each
other and contain indications of hurried legislative consideration."
Before considering the details of these statutes, a brief description of the
background may be helpful. Professional corporations and associations are
attractive because of federal income tax considerations. Persons engaging
in the business of rendering personal services may receive more favorable
tax treatment if the business is conducted in corporate form rather than
in partnership form. Partners are not deemed "employees" of the partner-
ship and hence are ineligible for substantial employee tax benefits." Earn-
ings may be accumulated at the lower tax rates applicable to corporations
and capital gains rates may be applicable upon the ultimate disposition of
the stock. Although most personal service businesses may incorporate
under the appropriate business corporation act, certain professions such as
attorneys, doctors and dentists have been prohibited by law from conduct-
ing business in corporate form. Such professionals first attempted to ob-
tain corporate tax treatment through the formation of associations which
cluded that these bills were unconstitutional to the extent that they attempted to impose criminal
liability on partnerships, trusts, and associations. This portion of the opinion inexplicably does not
refer either to the Uniform Partnership Act (enacted by Texas in 1961) or to the decisions in
other jurisdictions permitting partnerships to be criminally prosecuted. See, e.g., United States v.
A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121 (1958).
"See generally Comment, Air Pollution Control in Texas, 47 TEXAS L. REv. 1086, 1113, n.186
(1969).
16 Tex. Laws 1969, ch. 779, at 2304 [hereinafter referred to as the TPCA].
'"Id. ch. 840, at 2513 [hereinafter referred to as the TPAA].
" The two bills followed similar paths through the legislature. The Senate passed the TPCA
on April 22 and the TPAA on May 8. The House passed both bills on May 28, 1969, with a record
vote on the TPAA and a non-record vote on the TPCA. The TPCA was approved by the Governor
on June 14, 1969 (effective January 1, 1970), and the TPAA was approved on June 18, 1969
(effective immediately).
"' See Hall, Gissel & Blackshear, Professional Incorporation in Texas-A Current Look, 48 TEXAS
L. REV. 84 (1969); Hall & Gissel, Corporate Tax Treatment for Professions in Texas, 32 TEX. B.J.
588 (1969). The principal tax benefits of conducting a personal service business in the corporate
form are as follows: (1) The corporation may deduct, but the employee need not include in his in-
come, premiums for (a) up to $50,000 of group life insurance on the employee, TNT. REV. CODE
of 1954, § 79; (b) $2,000 of group life insurance on the employee's spouse and dependents, Treas.
Reg. § 1.61-(2) (d) (ii) (b) (1957), as amended, T.D. 6888, 1966-2 Cusm. BuLL. 491; (c) dis-
ability benefits under group life insurance contracts, Treas. Reg. § 1.79-31 (f) (3) (1966); (d)
medical expense and hospitalization insurance, TNT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 106. (2) The corporation
may create qualified pension and profit-sharing plans without regard to the limitations applicable
to "Keogh" or "H.R. 10" plans. TNT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 401 (a). However, under the new tax
bill these limitations are applied if the corporation makes a subchapter S election. Wall Street
Journal, Dec. 22, 1969, at 8, col. 5. The qualified pension or profit-sharing plan may also provide
for capital gains treatment of lump sum settlements, TNT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 402 (a) (2), and
distributions on the death of the employee free of the estate tax, id. S 2039(c). Neither of these
benefits is currently available under Keogh plans. (3) The corporation may pay a $5,000 death bene-
fit which is deductible by the corporation and not subject to estate tax by the recipient, TNT. REv.
CODE of 1954, § 101(b) (2). (4) The employer may create health and accident plans which may
make disability income payments of up to $100 a week. These payments are deductible by the em-
ployer and excludable from the income of the employee, TNT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 105 (b).
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resembled corporations in all respects except that articles of incorporation
were not filed. This form of organization was accorded corporate tax
treatment in the well-known case of United States v. Kintner"° and the
less well-known Texas decision of Gault v. United States.2'
In response to these decisions, the Internal Revenue Service amended its
regulations to exclude virtually all associations subject to the Uniform
Partnership Act or Uniform Limited Partnership Act from corporate
status." When Texas enacted its version of the Uniform Partnership Act in
1961, it included, as section 6(3),' a non-uniform provision designed to
preserve the right of associations to obtain corporate tax treatment by
electing not to be treated as a partnership subject to the Uniform Partner-
ship Act.
In other states, the professional corporation or professional association
became the preferred method for avoiding the impact of the Treasury reg-
ulations. These regulations relied on state law to determine whether an as-
sociation possessed specified corporate characteristics." The states were
quick to bend their laws to provide the new business forms with the nec-
essary corporate characteristics. In addition, in 1962 Congress attempted
to narrow the gap between incorporated and unincorporated personal
service businesses by permitting unincorporated businesses to establish
"Keogh" or "HR 10" plans. However, the substantial limitations on de-
ductions under those plans greatly reduced their desirability. 5 The growth
of professional corporation or association statutes therefore continued un-
abated. The response of the Internal Revenue Service was predictable.
Faced with what it considered to be a substantial loophole, the Service
adopted revised regulations purporting to deny corporate tax status to
such organizations. New litigation followed, resulting in holdings by the
courts of appeals of the Fifth,2" Sixth" and Tenth"° Circuits that the rules
were invalid. Unexpectedly, in August 1969, the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice announced that it did not plan to continue the court battle against
professional corporations or associations. In October, the Service an-
nounced that it was requesting legislation to close this loophole; 32 however,
20216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
21 175 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1959).
22 These are the famous "Kintner regulations," though a more apt phrase would be the "anti-
Kintner regulations." Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1960).
'TEX. REV. CirV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 6(3) (1962). The development of this section is
described in Bromberg, Texas Uniform Partnership Act-The Enacted Version, 15 Sw. L.J. 386
(1961).
24
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c) (1960).
' The principal limitation is that a Keogh plan deduction may not exceed $2,500 in any one
year. Other advantages of incorporation, described in note 19 supra, are unavailable in a Keogh plan.26 As of August 21, 1969, only three states and the District of Columbia did not have such
statutes. P-H 1969 FEDERAL TAXES 5 41,608.
7 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h) (1960), added by T.D. 6797, 1965-1 CuM. BULL. 553. The
new regulation deleted reference to reliance on state law and instead stated that professional relation-
ships are "inherently different from the relationships characteristic of an ordinary business cor-
poration" and defines most such relationships as being not corporate in character.
2SKurzner v. United States, 413 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1969).
29 O'Neill v. United States, 410 F.2d 888 (6th Cit. 1969).
"
5United States v. Empey, 406 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1969).
21 Treasury Information Release 1019 (1969).
3Wall Street Journal, Oct. 27, 1969, at 28, col. 2.
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this legislation was not forthcoming.3 As this Article is written, the tax
fight continues, and practitioners should be very cautious in making rec-
ommendations concerning professional corporations or associations. 4
During the survey period, Texas adopted both a professional corpora-
tion act (the TPCA) and a professional association act (the TPAA).
Since other states generally have enacted one or the other but not both,
the first question that should be raised is the relationship between the two
statutes. Apparently, the only reason Texas enacted both statutes was that
Texas doctors did not like the idea of forming professional corporations.
Section 3 (a) of the TPCA excludes "physicians, surgeons and other doc-
tors of medicine" from the operation of the TPCA since there are estab-
lished precedents allowing them to associate for the practice of medicine
in joint stock companies. Section 3 of the TPAA, on the other hand,
defines "professional services" simply as services for which a license is
required "and which service by law cannot be performed by a corpora-
tion." Presumably, "corporation" in the latter context includes profes-
sional corporations. If this is so, all professionals must use the TPCA ex-
cept doctors, who, if they wish to form a professional corporation, must
use the TPAA. Also, either group may presumably form either a joint
stock company" or a "common law partnership" under section 6(3) of
the Texas Uniform Partnership Act' without complying with the require-
ments of either the TPCA or the TPAA.
A temporary need to correlate these two Acts also arose because the
TPCA became effective on January 1, 1970, while the TPAA became
effective on June 18, 1969. If the provisions referred to in the preceding
paragraph are read literally, any non-medical professional group could
have used the TPAA in the period June 18-December 31, since until Jan-
uary 1, 1970, there was no statute under which the association could in-
corporate. The Secretary of State in fact accepted filings from any pro-
fessional group under the TPAA until January 1, 1970; at the time this is
written, there has been no resolution of the question of whether non-
medical professional associations formed in the interim period must now
reincorporate under the TPCA.
While there are many minor differences between a professional corpora-
tion organized under TPCA and a professional association organized under
the TPAA, the broad outlines of the two business forms are very similar.
Each has the following essential attributes:
83Id. Dec. 22, 1969, at 8, col. 5. The new bill merely limits the deductibility of contributions
by professional corporations and associations electing subchapter S treatment to the deductions per-
mitted in Keogh plans.
34 Caution is indicated for several reasons in addition to the continued battle over tax treat-
ment for professional corporations and associations. There may be adverse tax consequences when
incorporating an existing business which includes a large amount of uncollected receivables. The
new corporation may be subject to additional state taxes, including the franchise tax. Control prob-
lems may arise in the formation of a corporation. These and other problems are fully discussed in
Hall, Gissel & Blackshear, Professional Incorporation in Texas-A Current Look, 48 TExAs L. REV.
84 (1969). In addition, as discussed below, the substantive law applicable to professional corporations
and associations is not always as clear as might be desired. See also Jerome J. Roubik, 53 T.C. No. 36
(1969).
'TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 6133-38 (1962).
'
5 id. art. 6132(b), § 6(3). See text accompanying note 23 supra,
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(a) Each is formed by filing articles of association or incorporation
with the Secretary of State."'
(b) Each may be organized only to perform one type of professional
service."8
(c) Each may be formed by a single practitioner."
(d) Each may issue shares or "units of ownership" which are issuable
or transferable only to persons licensed to perform the same type of pro-
fessional service as that for which the corporation or association is
formed."
(e) Each contemplates that a person rendering professional services on
behalf of a professional corporation or association will be personally liable
for his negligence. The professional corporation or association will also be
liable for the negligence of such person. 1
(f) Each may continue, unaffected by changes in membership or
shareholders (at least until the death of the last member)'2 unless dis-
solved by a two-thirds vote of the members."
(g) Each has the customary entity characteristics of a corporation, in-
cluding property ownership, amenability to suit, and the like."
It is difficult to evaluate possible problems created by the numerous
variations in language and approach taken by these two statutes. Section
24 of the TPAA states that "except as otherwise provided in this Act,
and except as inconsistent with this Act, the statutory and common law
of partnerships shall apply to associations formed under this Act."" In
contrast, the TPCA states that "the Texas Business Corporation Act shall
be applicable to professional corporations, except to the extent that the
provisions of the Texas Business Corporation Act conflict with the provi-
sions of this Act."'2 Presumably these references to entirely different
bodies of law for supplementary legal principles will cause variations in
results which may range over a wide spectrum." As a practical matter,
3 7 TPAA 1 i2; TPCA § 4.
9 TPAA 5 2(b); TPCA §5 4, 6.
3 TPAA 5 2; TPCA § 4. However, the board of directors of a professional corporation must
consist of at least two directors, both of whom are duly licensed. TPCA § 9. No similar provision
appears in the TPAA.
40TPAA 5 10; TPCA § 12. Serious problems are created by the death of a shareholder which
are not really answered by the statutes. See, e.g., TPCA § 14. However, in most cases shareholders'
buy-out agreements will provide a practical answer to such problems.
4' TPAA § 7; TPCA § 16. The precise scope of this liability is not entirely clear. If professional
services are rendered by a partnership, each partner is jointly and severally liable for the negligence
of any partner or employee. The TPCA and TPAA apparently narrow the scope of this liability by
limiting it to the person performing the service and the professional association or corporation. Other
shareholders or owners are not personally liable in the absence of their negligence.
42 TPAA § 8 (B) (2) (until the death of the last member); TPCA § 7 (a) (perpetual succession).
Articles of association of a professional association* may be rejected for filing if they provide for
"perpetual succession."
"TPAA S 18(4); TPCA § 18.
4E.g., TPAA § 5; TPCA S 7.
TPAA 5 24.
" TPCA 55.
"" For example, an individual creditor of a member of a professional association would presumably
levy on the association interest of the member by the device of a charging order, on analogy with
a partnership. However, if a professional corporation were involved, attachment of the shares would
presumably be the appropriate remedy, subject to the perplexing requirement of TPCA § 14 that a
non-licensed person succeeding to a shareholder's interest "shall terminate all financial interest in
such professional corporation forthwith,"
1970]
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however, shareholder or membership contractual arrangements may fill
many of the gaps in legal principles that otherwise would be filled by ref-
erence to corporation or partnership statutes.
Throughout these two statutes there are many minor examples of slop-
py draftsmanship and failure to conform language. Examples include:
(1) Section 11 of the TPAA states: "The manner in which law-
yers practice law under this Act is subject to the powers of the
Supreme Court to regulate the practice of law.""8 The only thing
which prevents this language from being completely superfluous is
that the failure to conform the effective dates of the two statutes
allowed attorneys to form professional associations under the TPAA
from June 18, 1969 until January 1, 1970.
(2) "Architects" are a group referred to in the TPCA as being
unable to incorporate under the general business corporation acts, yet
the legislature, during the same session, specifically recognized that
architects may do business in the corporate form,4' and the Secretary
of State has ruled that this permits organization under the Texas
Business Corporation Act.
(3) The TPAA contains its own schedule of filing fees.' (Pre-
sumably the fees applicable to professional corporations are the same
as fees applicable to general business corporations). However, when
filing fees were generally raised as a revenue creating device, fees ap-
plicable to professional associations were apparently overlooked and
not increased.
(4) Professional associations must file an annual statement with
the Secretary of State, certifying that all members are licensed pro-
fessionals. 1 There is no similar requirement applicable to professional
corporations, although the need would appear to be the same.
Miscellaneous. The passage of an additional franchise tax on all corpora-
tions, ' and a new allocation formula for multi-state corporations promises
to increase substantially the state's return from this tax." Changes in the
franchise tax collection procedure were also made. 4 A new schedule of
filing fees for documents filed with the Secretary of State's office was also
established." Of particular interest is the increase of the fee for filing an
application of a foreign corporation to transact business in Texas from
I TPAA § 11 (emphasis added).49 Tex. Laws 1969, ch. 802, at 2377, 2380-81.
50TPAA § 22.
" TPAA § 21.
5"Tex. Laws 1969, ch. 1, art. 3, at 5, 32.
" Id., ch. 1, art. 7, at 5, 39.
'Tex. Laws 1969, ch. 801, at 2366. These changes include: (1) vesting collection procedures
in the Comptroller of Public Accounts rather than the Secretary of State; (2) changing the date
of reporting and payment from May 1 to June 15; (3) permitting a foreign corporation to with-
draw from transacting business in Texas rather than surrender its Certificate of Authority; (4) re-
quiring foreign corporations to post $500 in cash rather than posting a bond to cover franchise tax
liabilities; (5) changing the indexing procedure for recording franchise tax liens in the county
clerk's offices; (6) permitting administrative forfeitures of certificates for nonpayment of taxes;
and (7) permitting the reinstatement of judicially forfeited certificates.




$50" to $500. The fee for filing articles of incorporation of a domestic
corporation was only increased from $5 0 7 to $100.
The statutes relating to the formation and operation of credit unions
were completely revised and brought up to date.58 A new state agency,
the Credit Union Commission, was created to perform the regulatory
functions previously performed by the Banking Commissioner."9 Actual
regulation is performed by the Credit Union Commissioner, an employee
of the Commission who is to be elected by the Commission "by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate. ' 0
As previously noted, architects were accorded the privilege of conduct-
ing business in corporate form, even though personal liability continues to
exist."' The Secretary of State has construed these amendments to mean
that architects are subject to the Texas Business Corporation Act rather
than the Texas Professional Corporation Act. Local recording agents en-
gaged in the sale of fire and casualty insurance were also accorded the
privilege of incorporating, subject to licensing by the State Board of In-
surance."2 Incorporation of such businesses is also pursuant to the Texas
Business Corporation Act.
The Business and Commerce Code was amended to permit a guarantee
of the signature of a fiduciary on an assignment of securities to be exe-
cuted by an officer of an unincorporated bank or an agent of a firm that is
a member of the New York Stock Exchange as well as by an officer of a
national or incorporated state bank."3 In addition, the Texas Probate Code
was amended to specifically permit personal representatives to register
securities owned by the estate in the name of a nominee."
II. ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The most significant administrative developments during the year under
review concerned interpretations of the "Texas Blue Sky Law" by the State
Securities Board. In March 1969, the Board revised its interpretation of
the key statutory phrase, "fair, just and equitable"" to eliminate the
famous four-fifths test." This test limited the "spread" permitted between
I'TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 10.01A(4) (Supp. 1968).
a71d. art. 10.01A(1).
"STex. Laws 1969, ch. 186, at 540.
S Id. ch. 186, 5 38, at 557.
"i1d. ch. 186, 5 47, at 558-60.61 1d. ch. 802, 5 10, at 2377, 2381.
62 id. ch. 225, at 668. Such corporations must meet specified financial requirements including a
showing of the ability to pay any sum up to $25,000 on claims for negligence.
65id. ch. 691, at 2018. Section 33.09 was also amended to make it clear that Texas legislation
relating to fiduciary security transfers applies to national banking associations. Id. ch. 692, at 2019.
64Id. ch. 719, at 2016.
6 TEx. REV. CIrV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-7C(2) (1964): "The Commissioner . . . may enter an
order denying registration . . . if he finds .. . that any consideration paid, or to be paid, for such
securities by promoters is not fair, just and equitable where such consideration for such securities is
less than the proposed offering price to the public. ... See also id. art. 581-10A.
66 State Securities Board, Administrative Interpretation of Section 7C(2) and Section 10A of
the Securities Act of Texas (Mar. 26, 1969, amendment). This interpretative statement may be
obtained from the State Securities Board; it is reprinted in CCH BLUE SKY LAW Rp. 5 46,631
(1969). The 4/Sths rule is often referred to as the 5/4ths rule--the public offering price may not




the public offering price of a security and the price paid by the promoters.
The price to the promoters was deemed to be fair, just and equitable if it
was as much as four-fifths of the public offering price. As a practical mat-
ter, however, the test was not applied where there was an established
market price or a history of prior earnings. 7
The four-fifths test has been criticized on the ground that it results in
the setting of prices for securities offerings far below those prevailing in
a competitive market. " The elimination of this test was one of the prin-
cipal objectives of the draftsmen of the proposed Texas Uniform Securities
Act which was introduced but not enacted during the recent legislative
session. Section 306E of the proposed Act would have precluded an ob-
jection by the Commissioner to the market price of a security if the secur-
ities were to be distributed pursuant to a firm commitment underwriting
and registered under the Federal Securities Act of 1933."9 Section 306F
further would have excluded from consideration any differential between
the public price and the price paid by the promoters where (a) the security
was outstanding for a year and "the issuer has been a going concern ac-
tually engaged in business" during the year, or (b) the promoters agreed
to escrow the security for a year after the offering commenced.
The revised administrative interpretation eliminates all reference to a
mechanical formula. It states explicitly that a price determined with ref-
erence to established market prices for identical or equivalent securities
is ordinarily "fair, just and equitable." It also states explicitly that where
the issuer has a reliable record of earnings, a proposed price which "re-
flects a price earnings ratio . . . reasonably related to the price earnings
ratio of securities of similar issues in the same industry which have estab-
lished market prices" is also ordinarily "fair, just and equitable."7
Where the issuer has no established market price and no earnings rec-
ord, the revised interpretation states that, "primary consideration will be
given to the proposed offering price established by the underwriters if
there is a firm commitment by the underwriters and the proposed under-
writers have the financial ability to perform their commitment .... ""
However, if the Commissioner has doubts about the fairness of the pro-
6"7 If the shares had an established market price, the price of the new shares was compared to
the market price. If the corporation had an earnings history, the price of the new shares was com-
pared to a reasonable price under current market conditions in light of the earnings history. Even
where these patterns were absent it was sometimes possible to persuade the Commissioner that the
statutory standard was met even though the 4/5ths rule was not. Hence, despite the apparent ob-
jectivity of the 4/5ths rule, a considerable area- of administrative discretion nevertheless existed.
66 Bromberg, The Proposed Texas Uniform Securities Act, 31 TEX. B.J. 1030 (1968), states that
this is the "typical" consequence of the 4/5ths rule. The author continues:
Far from consistently protecting Texas investors, the result often is that offerings
are not made here at all, thus denying buying opportunities to local investors, com-
missions to Texas broker-dealers, and financing sources to local businesses. When se-
curities are sold here below their worth in the market, the holdings of prior investors
are diluted and the issuing company may get less money than it needs. Moreover,
artificially low prices encourage 'free riding' (purchases by insiders and speculators
who reap a quick profit on resale when the laws of supply and demand are allowed
to determine price in the after-market).
Id. at 1030.
69 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1964).
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posed price, the principal underwriter may be requested to justify his deci-
sion to market the securities at the proposed price."2 Of course, in the last
analysis, the Commissioner must make the final decision as to whether the
price is "fair, just and equitable." Finally, if a substantial disparity exists
between the price paid by the promoters and the public offering price, the
Commissioner may require the promoters to escrow their securities "for a
reasonable period of time." 3
The State Securities Board has also released an interpretation of section
5 (a), which deals with exemptions for shares issued in connection with
consolidations, mergers, and similar transactions. The interpretation makes
the exemption available to securities issued by a parent company in ex-
change for shares of another corporation where such corporation is to be
merged into an eighty per cent subsidiary of the parent corporation."
While such a transaction does not literally fall within the language of sec-
tion 5 (a), it seems clearly to fall within its intent.
The year also saw significant changes in personnel. At the Securities
Board, William M. King resigned as State Securities Commissioner after
twelve years in that post. Truman G. Holladay, Deputy Securities Com-
missioner, was appointed Securities Commissioner to succeed Mr. King,
and Roy M. Mouer was appointed Deputy Commissioner. James H. Milam
was appointed to the Securities Board replacing Randall Jackson. At the
Secretary of State's office, Martin Dies, Jr. became Secretary of State in
January 1969.
Both the Secretary of State's office and the State Securities Board handled
a large number of matters. During the 1968-1969 fiscal year, the Secre-
tary of State's office accepted for filing about 13,100 articles of incorpora-
tion for profit corporations and about 1,760 articles of incorporation for
nonprofit corporations; Texas currently ranks fourth in the states in the
total number of corporations formed. Only New York, California and
Florida record a greater number of incorporations. The State Securities
Board processed applications for more than $1.6 billion of securities. This
figure should be contrasted with the $1.15 billion processed in fiscal 1968
and $136 million processed in fiscal 1958. Applications processed in the
month of August alone exceeded the total of all applications processed in
fiscal 1958.
III. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS
The current year did not produce any truly fundamental decisions
dealing with the subject under review;' however, there are a few cases
7" Factors to be considered include potential earnings, ability and experience of management, the
contributions of promoters to the business, and the voting and preferential rights of the proposed
issue of securities.
" There appears to be no specific statutory authority for requiring this form of escrow, though
the Commissioner may inherently have the power to impose such a condition; if the escrow is in
fact created, it is clear that he has authority to determine that the price is fair, just and equitable.
Cf. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-9 (1964) authorizing the Commissioner to require the
issuer to escrow the securities or the proceeds thereof until it is clear that the public's interest
is protected.
" State Securities Board, Administrative Interpretation of Section 5(a) (adopted Jan. 16, 1969).
" It should be noted, however, that the year saw several significant federal decisions under the
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worthy of consideration which will be classified and discussed in a manner
similar to that used in previous Survey articles on this subject.
A. Partnerships
Texas enacted its version of the Uniform Partnership Act (hereinafter
referred to as TUPA) in 1961."M Apparently the existence of this statute is
unknown to many Texas attorneys and Texas appellate judges. Case after
case involving partnerships has been decided on the basis of pre-Uniform
Act precedents apparently in ignorance of the fact that a Texas statute
bears directly on the issue." Since the Texas Uniform Partnership Act re-
states many principles of common law partnership, the result reached in
many cases is consistent with the result that should be reached if the Act
were applied. However, the Texas version of the common law of partner-
ship was less than satisfactory in many respects,"' and it is unfortunate that
undesirable principles which have been specifically superseded by the Texas
Legislature should nevertheless continue to govern decisions. Obviously, the
blame for this state of affairs must be shared by the Texas bar as well as
the Texas appellate judges.
Three cases during the survey period raised the question of whether, on
the facts of the particular case, a partnership relationship was created.
None of the cases cited or relied on the simple and rather helpful rules
set forth in sections 6 and 7 of TUPA. In Jenkins v. Brodnax White
Truck Co."9 the Tyler court of civil appeals concluded that a lease of a
truck under which the gross profits of a trucking operation were shared
on a 70-30 basis did not create a partnership arrangement. The court
sought to apply the vague common law tests of whether the arrangement
created "a community of interest," "common enterprise" or "joint ac-
count" and "joint ownership in the profits as such," but ultimately relied
primarily on the notion that no inference of partnership should be drawn
from a sharing of gross (as contrasted with net) profits."0 In Arnold v.
Caprielians' the court of civil appeals held that an agreement to form a
partnership in 1949 remained executory and was abandoned where one
person never paid in his agreed share of capital, and accepted a refund of
the capital he did pay in. The other party then commenced business as a
sole proprietorship, and the claim that the partnership existed was not
various federal securities acts dealing with such diverse matters as proxy regulation, tender offers,
short swing trading, and the prohibition against insider trading set forth in rule lob-5. These de-
cisions are considered to be beyond the scope of this Article. Of particular interest to Texas prac-
titioners is Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969), which arose in Texas.
76 TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b (1962); see Bromberg, Texas Uniform Partnership
Act-The Enacted Version, 15 Sw. L.J. 386 (1961).
" The effective date of the Texas Uniform Partnership Act was January 1, 1962. TEX. REV.
CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 45 (1962). In many of the cases described below, the court does
not indicate when the transactions occurred. However, it is unlikely that many appeals handed
down in 1969 involve pre-1962 transactions.
78 See Sher & Bromberg, Texas Partnership Law in the 20th Century-Why Texas Should Adopt
the Uniform Partnership Act, 12 Sw. L.J. 263 (1958).
79437 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1969).
S"This distinction appears in TUPA § 7(4) (b), 7(3), TEX. REV. CIN. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b,55 7(4)(b), 7(3) (1962).81437 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1969), error ref. n.r.e.
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made until several years later. In Adcock v. Cousers' the Waco court of
civil appeals treated a transaction as a loan rather than as the formation
of a partnership.
Perhaps the most significant partnership case decided during the survey
period is Burns v. Gonzalez," involving the scope of the agency each part-
ner possesses to bind the partnership and the other partners. The partner-
ship was engaged in selling broadcast time on a Mexican radio station
located in Ciudad Acufia. It contracted to sell air time to the plaintiff over
a long term, but the station was unable to fulfill the commitment because
it was not operating for a period of time. One partner executed the
$40,000 note which was in question either in settlement of the plaintiff's
claim or to obtain additional time before the plaintiff brought suit for
breach of contract. Judge Cadena recognized that the authority of a part-
ner was governed by section 9 (1) of TUPA:
Every partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its busi-
ness, and the act of every partner, including the execution in the partnership
name of any instrument, for apparently carrying on in the usual way the
business of the partnership of which he is a member binds the partnership,
unless the partner so acting has in fact no authority to act for the partner-
ship in the particular matter, and the person with whom he is dealing has
knowledge of the fact that he has no such authority."
Relying on the italicized language, Judge Cadena stated that the scope of
the agency should be determined from "the way in which other firms en-
gaged in the same business in the locality usually transact business or the
way in which the particular partnership usually transacts its business. "
Further, the burden was on the party seeking to impose liability on the
partnership to establish the facts showing that agency exists. Finally, the
court adverted to the distinction established in pre-TUPA cases between
"trading" and "nontrading" partnerships," and concluded that the tests
for determining whether a partnership is to be classed as trading or non-
trading "is exactly the same test for imposition of liability embodied in
section 9 (1). This explains the fact that the U.P.A. makes no mention of
the distinction between trading and nontrading firms.""7 On the facts,
Judge Cadena concluded that the plaintiff had not shown that the partner
was acting within the scope of his authority when he executed the note.
The basic point in this opinion is sound: the scope of a partner's au-
thority should be determined from an analysis of the way business is reg-
ularly transacted by the partnership in question or by firms engaged in the
same business in the locality. It is unfortunate, however, that Judge Ca-
82442 S.W.2d 490 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1969).
8 439 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969), error ref. n.r.e.
S4 TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 9(l) (1962) (emphasis added).
85439 S.W.2d at 131.
"' See, e.g., Randall v. Meredith, 76 Tex. 669, 13 S.W. 576 (1890). Judge Cadena did not refer
to Professor Bromberg's "Source & Comments" note to section 9(1): This section "supersedes the
prior artificial and irrational distinction between 'trading' partnerships (which have implied power
to borrow regardless whether the loan is obtained in the usual course of business) and 'nontrading
partnerships' (which have no such implied power)." Bromberg, Source and Comments to Texas
Uniform Partnership Act, TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132(b), § 9(1), at 244 (1962).
'1439 S.W.2d at 133.
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dena felt it necessary to find the common law distinction between trading
and nontrading partnerships in section 9. It is true that a partner in a
partnership engaged in a retail sales business (a "trading" partnership)
may have power to borrow money while a partner in a partnership en-
gaged in the selling of radio time (a "nontrading" partnership) may not.
The difference in result, however, is explained by the difference in the na-
ture of the two businesses, not because one may be classed as a "trading"
partnership and the other as a "nontrading" partnership. Under the Texas
Uniform Partnership Act, the nature of the business is the test and it is
both unnecessary and confusing to classify a business as "trading" or
"nontrading."
In Morgan v. Arnold" the Dallas court of civil appeals upheld a judg-
ment for over $12,500 in compensatory damages and $25,000 in punitive
damages for fraud practiced by one partner on another partner in connec-
tion with the dissolution of a partnership. One partner was active in the
business, the other was inactive. After a personal disagreement, the parties
agreed that the active partner would purchase at book value the interest
of the inactive partner. The active partner submitted financial statements
prepared by a partnership employee which showed a one-half interest in
the partnership to be worth about $38,800, and the sale was completed at
this price. Subsequently at the trial all expert witnesses agreed this figure
was too low though the correct book value was debatable.
Undoubtedly, willful misrepresentation in the circumstances of this case
constituted fraud. The court relied on the strong statement in Johnson
v. Peckham9 that a fiduciary duty exists between partners, and when per-
sons enter into a partnership each consents, as a matter of law, to have
his conduct measured by the standards of finer loyalties exacted by the
courts of equity. The court, however, did not refer to section 20"° of the
Texas Uniform Partnership Act, which requires a partner to give "true"
information to other partners on demand. The award of substantial puni-
tive damages in this case highlights the fiduciary duties a partner assumes
when he enters into a partnership.
Article 2293 of the Texas statutes provides that a receiver may be ap-
pointed "in an action . ..between partners or others jointly owning or
interested in any property or fund, on the application of the plaintiff or
any party whose right to or interest in the property or fund ... is prob-
able, and where it is shown that the property or fund is in danger of being
lost, removed or materially injured."'" This rarely used provision was in-
voked in one recent case9" where a partnership had substantial assets, but
irregular withdrawals by several partners and borrowings by the partner-
ship to cover them threatened the orderly conduct of the partnership's
8 441 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969).
89 132 Tex. 148, 152, 120 S.W.2d 786, 788 (1938).
1OTEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, S 20 (1962).
8 1 Id. art. 2293(1) (1964).
12 M. Guerra & Son v. Manges, 442 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1969). The assets of
the partnership included 72,000 acres of land, 2,485 cattle, virtually half of the stock of a bank
in Rio Grande City, 150 town lots, and other property.
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business. In most situations, the right to an accounting"3 is an adequate
remedy for a partner; however, where assets are being withdrawn infor-
mally and irregularly, a receiver may be necessary to preserve adequately
the assets of the partnership pending winding up and termination of the
partnership.
B. Corporations
Articles dealing with corporations in previous Annual Surveys have
established a six-fold functional classification of cases. Although cases did
not arise in each of the categories during the survey period, the general
format has been followed in the analysis below.
Shares. In Ruthart v. First State BanYr shares were issued to an em-
ployee by a corporation. To raise the necessary cash, the employee exe-
cuted a promissory note to the bank which in turn issued its cashiers'
check payable to the corporation. The shares were assigned to the bank as
collateral. When the note fell due, the employee refused to pay, alleging
fraud by the corporation and violation of both article 12, section 6 of the
Texas Constitution' and article 2.16 of the Texas Business Corporation
Act (hereinafter referred to as the TBCA)." The court of civil appeals
quite properly rejected this argument on the ground that the statute and
constitutional provision were designed to prevent the corporation from
issuing shares without receiving the required consideration, and here the
corporation received full payment for its shares when it received the pro-
ceeds of the loan.9" Assuming (as claimed) that the transaction was frau-
dulent, the proper solution is suit by the defrauded employees against the
corporation and its agents who committed the fraud.
Employees are commonly promised shares in a corporation as part of
their remuneration. Article 2.16 provides that shares may be issued only
for "work done" and that a promise of future services is not appropriate
consideration. In Irwin v. Prestressed Structures, Inc."' it was recognized
that article 2.16 does not render unenforceable all promises of shares to
employees, but merely requires that the shares not be issued until the end
of the employment period."
The last decision involving article 2.16 reflects an unfortunate mis-
11See TEX. REv. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 22 (1962).
94431 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1968), error ref.
11 TEX. CONST. art. 12, § 6 states: "No corporation shall issue stock or bonds except for money
paid, labor done or property actually received, and all fictitious increase of stock or indebtedness
shall be void."
16 TEx. Bus. CoRp. ACT ANN. art. 2.16A (1956) states that the consideration received may be
"money paid," and that shares may not be issued "until the full amount of the consideration ...
has been paid." Id. art. 2.16B adds that promissory notes do not "constitute payment or part pay-
ment for shares of a corporation."
" The decision is also consistent with one pre-TBCA decision. Weichsel v. Jones, 109 S.W.2d
332 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1937).
8442 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1969).
" The court distinguished United Steel Indus. Inc. v. Manhart, 405 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1966), error ref. n.r.e., where shares were issued partially for past services and partially
for future services. The Manhart court refused to allocate and invalidated the entire issue. Under




understanding of the statute's purpose. In Jackson v. Gish1 ' it was alleged
that certain directors had issued shares to themselves without considera-
tion. However, after issuance of the shares in question, a resolution was
adopted at a shareholders' meeting (by a vote of 84,445 to 12,039) recit-
ing that the defendants had worked for the corporation for four years
without adequate compensation, that the corporation did not have suffi-
cient cash to pay the defendants a reasonable salary, that the defendants
had waived any claim for cash payment for work previously done, and
that the issuance of shares to defendants was therefore validated, ratified
and confirmed. A jury apparently found that the directors had agreed to
issue shares to themselves without adequate consideration but answered
negatively the question of whether the defendants acted "with malice."
The court of civil appeals reversed, and rendered in favor of the directors,
holding that under article 2.16C the judgment of the directors was con-
clusive in the absence of fraud as to the value of consideration received
for shares,10 and that the jury had found that no fraud existed.'
The basic difficulty with this reasoning is that the court considered only
article 2.16 and completely ignored the general principle that a director is
subject to fiduciary duties whenever he deals individually with the cor-
poration. This principle is particularly apt where a director causes a cor-
poration to issue shares to himself in consideration of services previously
performed by the director, since the director may be tempted to issue an
unreasonable number of shares. In Texas and elsewhere, a transaction be-
tween director and corporation is voidable if unfair,' even though it
has been ratified by a majority vote of the shareholders.' Thus, the court
should have decided the fairness of the transaction rather than relying
solely on the absence of fraud.
One important case involving the scope of the private offering exemp-
tion of the Texas Securities Act' 2 was decided by the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals during the survey period. In Dean v. State"° the defend-
ant was fined $2,000 for selling securities without a license. The security
involved was an "override" contract in Vitro Seat Company whereby for
an investment of $1,000 the purchaser would receive two cents upon each
500440 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1969).
101 Trx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.16C (1956): "In the absence of fraud in the transaction,
the judgment of the board of directors . . . as to the value of the consideration received for shares
shall be conclusive."
10aThe court treated the jury finding that the defendants had not acted "with malice" as in-
dicating an "absence of fraud."
It should be noted that the shares apparently were issued irregularly-the consideration for the
shares was not "expressed in dollars" as required by Tsx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.15A (1956).
Presumably, however, failure to express the consideration in dollars would not automatically in-
validate the issuance of shares if some consideration was received and there was no fraud.
'Henger v. Sale, 365 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. 1963); Popperman v. Rest Haven Cemetery, Inc., 162
Tex. 255, 345 S.W.2d 715 (1961).
' Wiberg v. Gulf Coast Land & Dev. Co., 360 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1962),
error ref. n.r.e. See also Note, 41 TExAs L. REv. 726 (1963).
'a TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-51 (a) (1964): "[T]he provisions of this Act shall not
apply . . . . [I] Provided such sale is made without any public solicitation or advertisements, [to]
(a) the sale of any security by the issuer thereof so long as the total number of security holders of
the issuer thereof does not exceed thirty-five (35) persons after taking such sale into account ... "
"' Tex. Ct. Crim. App. No. 41,204 (May 15, 1968).
[Vol. 24
CORPORATIONS
sale of a Vitro Seat unit. The total number of contract holders was less
than thirty-five and no advertising was employed; the private offering
exemption was therefore available, absent "public solicitation" in the sale
of the override contracts. In the original opinion Judge Onion, in effect,
read into the phrase "public solicitation," the tests applicable to the ex-
emption in the Federal Securities Act as set forth in SEC v. Ralston Purina
Co.1  These tests limit the private offering exemption to offers to persons
who do not need the protection of registration either because they possess
or have access to necessary information, or have such close relationships
with the issuer as to make fraud unlikely. On rehearing, however, the
court substituted a new opinion ' s which did not specify a precise test for
determining what is a "public solicitation." After describing the prior
Texas cases dealing wtih the meaning of this phrase,'"0 the court stated that
the following facts created a jury issue as to whether there was a "public
solicitation:" (a) Dean did not seek out the investor but merely partici-
pated in completing the sale; (b) the investor had decided before the
meeting with Dean to purchase the override contract; (c) Dean's presence
at the meeting was not the procuring cause of the sale; and (d) "all
[other] facts and circumstances in evidence." '
An option contract to purchase shares of stock is governed by the same
principles as an option contract to purchase other kinds of property. If
the holder of the option desires to exercise it, he must comply with the
conditions of the contract. Two cases during the survey period involved at-
tempts by holders to exercise options to purchase shares. One such at-
tempted exercise was held to be effective, the other not. In Hundahl v.
Armstrong"' the optionee had until April 15, 1967, to exercise the option.
At about 4:30 p.m. on April 15, 1967 (a Saturday), he drove to the home
of the optionor, stated that he was there to exercise the option, handed
the optionor a personal (uncertified) check for the purchase price, and
then stated that he thereby exercised the option. The optionor refused to
accept the check. On Monday morning, the optionee obtained $33,748.65
in cash and tendered payment to the optionor, which was refused as being
too late. The court of civil appeals held that the option had been effectively
exercised by notifying the optionor of its exercise on April 15. Since the
option did not require payment on April 15, the optionee had a reasonable
time thereafter to complete the transaction. In Ferguson v. von S eggern,"2
on the other hand, the option agreement contained detailed provisions for
determining the option price, including the selection of professional real
107346 U.S. 119 (1953).
100Dean v. State, 433 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
105Birchfield v. State, 401 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966); Tumblewood Bowling Corp.
v. Matise, 388 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1965), error ref. n.r.e. See generally Brom-
berg, Texas Exemptions for Small Offerings of Corporate Securities-The Prohibition on Advertise-
ments, 20 Sw. L.J. 239 (1966).
"11Dean v. State, 433 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968). While these justifications may
seem unpersuasive, there is also a problem in importing the subjective tests of Ralston Purina into
a statute which contains specific numerical requirements-apparently the legislature intended the
test to be largely numerical. See Bromberg, Texas Exemptions for Small Offerings of Corporate Se-
curities, 18 Sw. L.J. 537, 539 (1964).
1436 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
11434 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
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estate appraisers. The optionee gave notice of his exercise of the option,
but failed to follow the agreed provisions governing determination of the
price. Thereafter, more than a year later but still within the option period,
he again attempted to exercise the option and to comply with the option
contract valuation provisions. The refusal by the trial court to grant spe-
cific performance was held not to be an abuse of discretion. The court of
civil appeals stated that time was "of the essence," and the optionee there-
fore had failed to comply with the conditions of the agreement within a
reasonable period. With specific performance foreclosed, the optionee might
now sue for damages, though how damages might be measured is un-
certain.
Piercing the Corporate Veil. Texas courts continue to struggle with un-
satisfactory doctrines as to when the corporate entity will be ignored.
Despite a rather helpful opinion by the Texas supreme court which was
described in last year's Survey,"' the courts still fail to articulate the bases
of their decisions and rely instead on catch phrases which shed little or no
light on the reasons underlying specific holdings.
A good example is Western Rock Co. v. Davis."' Stroud and Fuller were
directors, officers and shareholders of Western Rock Company, a corpora-
tion engaging in blasting operations which damaged property of others.
Stroud actually supervised the blasting operations. Fuller supplied funds to
the corporation either directly or by arranging bank loans; he permitted
the blasting operations to continue even though he was aware that they
were causing damage. He also managed corporate affairs for a brief period.
The physical assets of Western Rock were leased from Fuller or from a
family corporation owned by Fuller. Apparently the financial affairs of
Western Rock gradually deteriorated, since by the time recoveries for the
damaged property were obtained against Western Rock, the assets of the
corporation had all been reclaimed by Fuller's family corporation. The in-
surance and other assets of the corporation were insufficient to pay the
judgments. In holding Fuller and Stroud personally liable, the court of
civil appeals said:
It appears obvious from the record that appellees' cause of action against
Fuller is based upon ample proof that he was the dominating force behind
Western Rock, a shell corporation, which had no assets and was in financial
difficulty. That the corporation served as a device through which Fuller and
Stroud could carry on destructive blasting activities at the expense of the
property owners of Jacksboro, and at the same time be personally insulated
from legal and financial responsibility against wrongs which were knowing-
ly permitted, directed and controlled by them through the corporation de-
vice."'
The court then cited several cases involving attempts to disregard the
corporate entity in contract cases, and concluded by citing oft-quoted
"'The decision is Bell Oil & Gas Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 431 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. 1968),
discussed in Amsler, Corporations, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 98, 101 (1969).
114 432 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968).
"5 432 S.W.2d at 558.
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statements that the corporate entity will be disregarded if it is organized
as a "mere tool or business conduit," or is relied on "to justify wrong," or
is used as a "means of perpetrating fraud.""...
The result reached by this case seems entirely sound on the facts even
though the rationalization of the court is not very helpful. The following
comments may help to put the result reached in perspective:
(a) It appears that Stroud (and probably Fuller) actually committed
tortious acts or supervised other persons who actually committed such
acts. They should therefore be personally liable. The fact that they were
also agents of a corporation only means that the corporation is also liable;
it does not protect them from tort liability for their own acts. On the
same theory, a corporate agent who negligently drives an automobile
while engaged in corporate business is personally liable for any injuries he
causes. Thus, this case probably could have been decided on simple tort
principles without any reference to "piercing the corporate veil."
(b) In cases such as this, a sharp distinction should be drawn between
claims based on contract and claims based on tort." ' In contract cases, the
plaintiff usually has dealt in some way with the corporation, and often is
aware that the corporation lacks assets. In the absence of some sort of
deception, a contract creditor therefore usually has little cause for com-
plaint if the corporation becomes insolvent. In a sense, by dealing with a
"shell corporation" without insisting on a guarantee by a financially secure
person, the third person voluntarily assumes the risk of loss. In tort cases,
on the other hand, the creditor usually has not had prior dealings with the
corporation, but rather becomes a creditor against his will when injured
by the tortious conduct. It may be unreasonable for a person to transfer
the risk of loss for tortious conduct to the general public. For this reason,
in tort cases courts should be more liberal in refusing to recognize the cor-
porate entity. In the case under discussion, for example, at least two rea-
sons for refusing to recognize the separate corporate existence of Western
Rock Company might be suggested:
(i) It is against public policy for a corporation to engage in inherently
risky conduct such as blasting without a considerable amount of financial
stability (either in the form of assets or insurance). A person engaging in
conduct with such a high likelihood of causing harm to others should
not be allowed to avoid liability merely by conducting business through a
nominally capitalized corporation."' In this argument, the nature of the
business forms the basis for decision.
"6 Language to this general effect appears in numerous cases, including Pacific Am. Gasoline Co.
v. Miller, 76 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1934), error ref.
117 The recent supreme court opinion in Bell Oil & Gas Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 431 S.W.2d
336 (Tex. 1968), suggests this distinction.
1 It is sometimes objected that the legislature rather than the courts should formulate a public
policy of the nature suggested. However, a decision either way in effect establishes a public policy,
so that judicial formulation of policy is unavoidable. Also, courts do respond regularly to notions of
public policy, and it is unrealistic to assume that they do not or should not. For example, in the
case under discussion, the court was clearly influenced by the fact that a nominally capitalized cor-
poration was engaging in the risky business of blasting. Is it not better for the courts to articulate
the true basis of their decisions rather than hiding in meaningless rhetoric?
The New York courts have intimated that the incorporation statutes establish a public policy
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(ii) Fuller may have acted unfairly by failing to buy insurance or by
permitting the corporation's financial affairs to deteriorate while retaining
a lessor's interest in the operating assets of the corporation. By this device,
not even the operating assets were available to satisfy tort claimants. In
this argument, the way the business was conducted forms the basis for deci-
sion.
Three cases decided during the survey period highlight the fact that
corporations are separate entities distinct from their officers, directors,
shareholders, and other corporations under common ownership. These
cases may be conveniently considered at this point.
Many retail chain stores consist of a parent corporation and numerous
subsidiary corporations, each operating a single store. The Sage chain con-
ducts business in such a fashion. The parent corporation is Sage, Inc., In-
ternational, while the Dallas store is operated by Sage, Inc. of Dallas, and
the Houston store is operated by S.A.G.E., Inc. of Houston. When suit is
brought against a corporation in such a chain it is obviously important
that the attorney ascertain that he is naming the proper corporate defend-
ant. In Lunsford v. Sage, Inc. of Dallas"9 the plaintiff brought suit against
the Dallas corporation for false imprisonment arising out of an incident
in the Houston store. He apparently was misled in this regard by em-
ployees of Sage. An answer on the merits was filed by defendant's attorney
without reference to the error of naming the wrong corporation as de-
fendant. After the statute of limitations had expired, the answer was
amended, denying that the corporate defendant owned the Houston store.
The plaintiff attempted to amend his pleadings to name the proper de-
fendant, but the court of civil appeals held that the statute of limitations
prevented him from doing so. Moreover, the court held that the named
defendant was not estopped by its earlier representations and pleadings from
denying that it owned the store in question. The plaintiff was, therefore,
out of court. Putting aside comment on the propriety of the actions of
the defendant's attorney in this case, or the correctness of the court's rul-
ing on the estoppel issue, the basic lesson is clear: make sure you sue the
correct corporation.
A similar lesson may be drawn from Electrical Contracting & Mainte-
nance Co. v. Perry Distributors, Inc.12' Fuller, the president of Electrical
Contracting & Maintenance Company, Inc., called Perry Distributors,
Inc. to order certain appliances for an apartment project owned by
Fuller personally. Fuller asked that the bill be sent to the corporation; it
was unclear whether the bill was to be sent to Fuller at the corporate ad-
dress or to the corporation itself, which was doing some work on the pro-
permitting nominally capitalized corporations to enter into a risky business such as operating a
taxicab in New York City. Walkovsky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d 6, 276 N.Y.S.2d
585 (1966). In contrast, California takes the view that a corporation, to be recognized, must be
established with sufficient capital reasonably to cover probable liabilities in the particular line of
business. Minton v. Caveney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 364 P.2d 473, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1961). Thus, there
is sharp disagreement in the two most populous states as to the appropriate public policy in this
area.
"9438 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969), error ref. n.r.e.
120432 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969), error ref. n.r.e.
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ject. Plaintiff's complaint alleged that Fuller had purchased the appliances
and stated that the defendant corporation was named "for the reason that
the Defendant Fuller, as owner and president of said corporation, directed
Plaintiff to send a bill to the said corporation, inasmuch as it had the elec-
trical subcontract on the apartment project.. ' ... However, the case was
submitted to the jury on the theory that the corporation was the pur-
chaser, acting through its president, by express or implied contract. This
variance between allegation and submission resulted in a reversal and re-
mand to consider Fuller's personal liability for the appliances. Here again,
failure to distinguish sharply between the corporation and the individual
resulted in an avoidable and expensive appeal.
Also of interest is Schaffer v. Universal Rundle Corp.,"'2 in which the
Fifth Circuit held it improper in. an antitrust case to join a sole shareholder
as plaintiff when only the corporation had been injured. The court felt
that joining the shareholder might result in an inflation of the size of the
award.
Fiduciary Duties. Three cases involving fiduciary duties owed by direc-
tors to their corporations were decided during the survey period. In
Reynolds-Southwestern Corp. v. Dresser Industries, Inc.'2 the court of
civil appeals applied a fairness test to determine the enforceability of a
contract between two corporations with common directors. The court also
stated, in a questionable dictum, that enforcement of such contracts "is
not favored by the law." In this case, Beeman and Parker, on the one
hand, and Reynolds, on the other, agreed to enter into a joint venture, in
corporate form, to market an invention owned by Reynolds. The result
was the creation of Reynolds-Southwestern Corporation. Reynolds was
issued fifty per cent of the shares and a corporation owned by Beeman and
Parker, Southwestern Industrial Electronics Company, owned the balance.
Reynolds, Beeman and Parker were directors of Reynolds-Southwestern
and Beeman and Parker were directors of Southwestern Industrial. Several
years later the parties agreed to terminate their relationship, and the con-
tract in dispute, between Reynolds-Southwestern and Southwestern Indus-
trial, was executed to reflect this settlement. Reynolds-Southwestern there-
after stopped making payments required by the settlement on the ground
of fraud. The court of appeals held that issues of fact should have been
submitted to the jury to determine whether Beeman and Parker had acted
in good faith, and whether the contract was a fair one. In addition, the
court stated that fiduciary duties also existed between the parties because
they were. joint venturers, despite the formation of. a corporation."
"'Id. at 545.
152 397 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1968).
'438 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969), error ref. n.r.e.
524 Compare the following dictum from Colonial Refrigerated Transp., Inc. v. Mitchell, 403
F.2d 541, 548 (5th Cir. 1968):
There is authority that, when parties choose to do business as a corporation and thus
gain the advantage of the corporate business form, including limited liability, they
cease to be joint venturers and thereafter have only the rights, duties, and obligations
of stockholders. These cases reason that the investors *are not at one and the same time
1970]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
The second case, Wortham v. Lacbman-Rose Co.,"' involved the duties
of the directors of an insolvent corporation to the creditors of the cor-
poration. Stating that the assets of an insolvent corporation constitute a
"trust fund" for the benefit of creditors,." the court of civil appeals re-
quired the directors to restore to the corporation money they had paid to
themselves in satisfaction of a claim. The claim the directors satisfied arose
from their payment of certain corporate debts which they had guaranteed.
The trust fund theory developed in this case would appear to prevent the
directors of an insolvent corporation from making a preferential payment
to any creditor."'
In the final case, Stockton v. Lake Tanglewood & Skybolt, Inc.,"' the
court cancelled a deed from a corporation to one of its directors on the
ground of "unfairness and lack of consideration." Apparently, the other
directors were unaware of the conveyance.
Miscellaneous. Several miscellaneous decisions involving corporations
should be noted. The Austin court of civil appeals".9 held that a small
business investment company was not exempt from the franchise tax as a
"mutual investment company. '
The Texas venue statute" permits suit to be brought against a corpora-
tion in several different counties: (a) in the county in which the cor-
poration's registered office is located, 3' (b) in the county in which the cor-
poration's "principle office" is situated, (c) in the county in which the
cause of action or part thereof arose, (d) in the county in which the plain-
tiff resided when the cause of action arose, provided the corporation has
an "agency or representative" in the county, or (e) if the corporation has
no "agency or representative" in the county of the plaintiff's residence,
then in the county nearest to the one in which plaintiff resided in which
the corporation has an "agency or representative.""' Questions continue to
arise relating to the proper application of these provisions. In Sani-Serv
joint venturers and stockholders, fiduciaries and nonfiduciaries, personally liable and
not personally liable.' However, there is also persuasive and well-reasoned authority
that a joint venture agreement continues in effect following the formation of a cor-
poration created to implement it if the parties' intention to this effect is clear.
Apparently, the Texas courts have never had occasion to adopt either view ....
2' 440 S.W.2d 351 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969).
"" This language appears in Lyons-Thomas Hardware Co. v. Perry Stove Mfg. Co., 86 Tex. 143,
24 S.W. 16 (1893).
127See Waggoner v. Herring-Showers Lumber Co., 120 Tex. 605, 40 S.W.2d 1 (1931).
128 441 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1969). Another portion of this opinion holds
that a corporation is bound by its officer's knowledge respecting a transaction in which the cor-
poration was represented by the officer in question.
I'Calvert v. Capital Sw. Corp., 441 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1969), error ref.
n.r.e.
"STEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 12.03 (1969). Small business investment companies are
formed under the TBCA, registered under the Federal Investment Company Act of 1940, and li-
censed under the Small Business Investment Act of 1958. They invest in obligations of small business
firms and exercise some degree of control over the portfolio companies.
"lId. art. 1995(23).
". See Ward v. Fairway Operating Co., 364 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. 1963).
"'This list is not exclusive. For example, if two defendants are involved, both may be sued
in a county in which venue is proper for either. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(4), (29a)
(1964).
The Texas venue statutes are discussed in VanDercreek, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey
of Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 177, 185 (1969); id., 21 Sw. L.J. 155, 158 (1967).
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Freezer Sales, Inc. v. Coker ' the court of civil appeals held, in a breach
of contract case, that venue was proper under clause (c) where suit was
brought in a county (1) in which it was conceded that the contract was
made, and (2) in which the defendant breached a warranty made in the
contract. In Hydrostatic Engineers, Inc. v. Rapid Service, Inc." the court
held that venue was proper in a contract case in the county where, pur-
suant to the contract, the plaintiff deposited money to the defendant's
account, and suit was for its recovery. Finally, in Cotton Concentration
Co. v. A. Lassberg el Co.,'" the court held that Cotton Concentration
Company maintained an "agency or representative" in Dallas County
under clauses (d) and (e) under the following circumstances:
The Cotton Exchange Building in Dallas County is an office building occu-
pied primarily by cotton merchants engaged in buying and selling cotton,
who are customers or potential customers of appellant .... [F]or more than
thirty-eight years appellant has leased an office in the Cotton Exchange Build-
ing . . . . Its office is listed in the building directory and in the telephone
directory in the name of appellant, Cotton Concentration Company, Inc ....
[A]ppellant has maintained William Brown, a salaried member of its staff, in
its Dallas office where he has been accessible to look after its business in the
Dallas area .... Brown was authorized to and did solicit business on appellant's
behalf and represented appellant in handling business problems that arose in
dealings between the cotton merchants in the area and appellant's warehouse in
Galveston .... Brown maintained in his office in Dallas regular business files
including correspondence, records and warehouse receipts when delivered to
him, and other business records which came through his office. Possession of
warehouse receipts by Brown was regarded by appellant as its own posses-
sion.1"'
The court rejected the argument that an agent with power to contract for
the principal was necessary to constitute an "agency or representative"
under the venue statute.
Several cases illustrate little more than that corporations have to "cut
square procedural corners" in Texas. Many of these cases involve mistakes
or carelessness by attorneys. In Globe Leasing, Inc. v. Engine Supply &
Machine Service'5 an appeal by a corporation was dismissed in part on the
ground that the president of the corporation (who was not an attorney)
had filed an answer and appeared on behalf of the corporation. The court
of civil appeals held that the right of an individual to appear in person
does not extend to a corporation which may appear only through a licensed
attorney. in Diamond Chemical Co. v. Sonoco Products Co.3"' a sheriff's
citation that service had been executed by "delivering to each of the
within named defendants" a copy of the citation and complaint "at the
following times and places, to wit: Diamond Chemical Co., Inc. by serv-
ing Burton B. Jones 11-20-67 8:10 a.m." was held insufficient to support a
4 441 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1969).
133439 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969), error dismissed. In this case the court
also held that venue was proper under TEX. REV. Cry. SrAr. ANN. art. 1995(5) (1964).
18433 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1968).
127Id. at 740.
'a 437 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969).
'39437 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1968).
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default judgment because it failed to show "the manner of service."" In a
similar case, "1 service on "Bankers Life & Casualty Co. by serving its
agent Everett Hall" was held insufficient to support a default judgment
against a foreign corporation because the record failed to show that Hall
fell within one of the categories of agents referred to in articles 2031 or
203 Ia.' In Curry v. Dell Publishing Co."' service on a foreign corpora-
tion through the Secretary of State was held inadequate because of failure
to allege necessary facts under the Texas Long Arm Statute.'" The further
argument that attempted removal of the case to the federal court consti-
tuted a general appearance was also rejected. In another case, the Texas
Long Arm Statute was held to be not long enough to reach a New York
corporation whose only contact with Texas was the receipt of orders in
New York by mail or plane from Texas and the shipping of merchandise
from New York to Texas by turning the goods over to an independent
carrier in New York.'"
Finally, two cases involved the power of a corporation, whose charter
has been forfeited for nonpayment of franchise taxes, to maintain suit in
Texas courts. In Texas Machinery & Equipment Co. v. Gordon Knox Oil
& Exploration Co." the Texas Machinery & Equipment Company assigned
all its assets to certain foreign corporations in 1962; among the assets so
assigned was a suit against one Montgomery. A judgment was shortly
thereafter obtained in the name of Texas Machinery but was not satisfied.
The company was apparently then abandoned. Its charter was forfeited
for nonpayment of franchise taxes in 1963. In 1967, the assignees were
given cause to believe that Gordon Knox Oil & Exploration Co. might be
indebted to Montgomery. Garnishment proceedings were then instituted
in the name of Texas Machinery & Equipment Company and Gordon
Knox permitted a default judgment to be entered against it."7 In a pro-
ceeding to set aside the default judgment, it was argued that the statutory
provisions closing Texas courts to corporations whose charters have been
defaulted for failure to pay franchise taxes" " precluded a garnishment pro-
ceeding in the name of the defaulted corporation. The Texas supreme
court rejected this argument on the theories that (a) an assignee may
proceed in the name of an assignor even though the assignor has dissolved,
and (b) the procedure followed was consistent with the general practice of
issuing ancillary process in the name of the party in whose favor the judg-
140TEX. R. Cry. P. 107. The court relied primarily on Hyltin-Manor Funeral Home v. Hill, 304
S.W.2d 469 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1957), which points out that the manner of service
might involve reading the citation or leaving a copy at the defendants .residence .
"'Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Watson, 436 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968), error
ref. m.r.e. .
"' TEx. REv. CrV. STAT. ANN. arts. 2031, 2031a .(1964).
"4438 S'.W.2d 887 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eil Paso 1969), error dismissed.
'"TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (1964).
'"Bodzin v. Regal Accessories, Inc., 437 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 199), error ref.
n.r.e.
'4442 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. 1969).
117 Gordon Knox was not in fact indebted to Montgomery. The company permitted the judgment
to be entered because the Secretary-Treasurer of that company was unaware that it was necessary
to file an answer even though no indebtedness existed.
148TEx. REv. CIr. STAT. ANN. art. 12.14 (Supp. 1968).
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ment was rendered. In effect, the supreme court recognized that the as-
signees rather than the dissolved corporation were the real party in interest.
In contrast, in Radar Leasing Corp. v. Wholesome Dairy, Inc.,"' the cor-
poration had assigned all its assets, other than the claim on which suit was
brought, forfeited its charter for nonpayment of franchise taxes, and then
attempted to bring suit on the claim. Not surprisingly, the court of civil
appeals held that the suit was barred unless the corporation paid the de-
linquent franchise taxes owed to the state of Texas.
' The court also held that the negligence of the Gordon Knox Company in failing to answer
the garnishment was not excusable. The court of civil appeals, in Texas Mach. & Equip. Co. v. Gor-
don Knox Oil & Exploration, 434 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1968), had held that the
failure to pay the franchise taxes barred the suit, though the court may partially have been motivat-
ed by other considerations, since it stated that there was no "evidence in this case that the- appel-
lants were representing [the assignees] in their effort to take $11,080.00 away from a completely
innocent party."
'50442 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969).
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